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II. STA TEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of a successive petition for post-conviction
relief. R 149-151. Relief should be granted because the district court erred in summarily
dismissing the petition without providing twenty days notice to the petitioner.
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts

Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,256 P.3d 791 (2011), sets out much of the background of
this case. Per Schultz, Mr. Schultz was found guilty in separate cases of felony domestic
violence and possession of methamphetamine. He directed his attorney to file notices of appeal,
however, the notices of appeal were not timely filed and three years later, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the cases. After the state filed its brief in the consolidated appeals, but before the
Court's dismissal, Mr. Schultz filed petitions for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel, but not mentioning the failure to file timely notices of appeal. Thereafter,
those petitions were dismissed as being untimely filed. And, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed those summary dismissals. Id
Prior to the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the dismissal of the original petition for
post-conviction relief, Mr. Schultz filed a pro se successive petition claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel on the original petition and newly discovered evidence relating to
improprieties at the state lab and as to a felony record of a person involved in the drug case. R 1-

4.
Eventually counsel was appointed and an amended petition filed. R 95-101. (Neither the
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the pro se petition nor the amended petition were verified. 1 R 1-4; 95-101.) The amended
petition continued to raise the claims of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel
and newly discovered evidence. R 95-101.
The state moved for summary dismissal. R 106-118. In neither its initial motion and
brief in support nor its reply to Mr. Schultz's opposition did the state raise the argument that Mr.
Schultz was not entitled to relief on his claim that the original post-conviction counsel had been
ineffective because a post-conviction petitioner does not have a constitutional or statutory right to
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. R 106-118; 130-134. Rather, the state argued
that Mr. Schultz had failed to demonstrate that post-conviction counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness or was prejudicial. Id.
The district court granted the state's motion, but not on the basis set forth by the state.
Rather, the court summarily dismissed the claim of ineffective assistance on the grounds that Mr.
Schultz did not have a constitutional or statutory right to effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel. R 13 9-141. The court also dismissed the claim based upon newly discovered
improprieties at the state lab. R 135-146.
A final judgment was entered. R 147.
A timely notice of appeal was filed. R 149-151.

See State v. Goodrich, 103 Idaho 430,431,649 P.2d 389,390 (Ct. App. 1982),
reversed on other grounds, 104 Idaho 469, 660 P .2d 934 ( 1983 ), holding that lack of verification
was not fatal to a petition for post-conviction relief.
1

2

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Should the order summarily dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim be
reversed because the district court dismissed on grounds not stated in the state's motion for
summary dismissal without giving a 20-day notice and allowing Mr. Schultz to respond?

IV. ARGUMENT
The Order Of Summary Dismissal Of The Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Claim Should Be Reversed Because The District Court Did Not Provide The
Required 20-Day Notice
The district court dismissed Mr. Schultz's petition for post-conviction relief on grounds
other than the grounds set out in the state's motion for summary disposition. Therefore, the
dismissal was sua sponte and without proper notice. The appropriate remedy is reversal of the
order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
The applicable law is set out in Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct. App.
2009):
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), the district court may sua sponte dismiss an
applicant's post-conviction claims if the court provides the applicant with notice
of its intent to do so, the ground or grounds upon which the claim is to be
dismissed, and twenty days for the applicant to respond. Pursuant to LC.§ 194906(c), if the state files and serves a properly supported motion to dismiss,
further notice from the court is ordinarily unnecessary. Saykhamchone v. State,
127 Idaho 319,322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). The reason that subsection (b),
but not section (c), requires a twenty-day notice by the court of intent to dismiss is
that, under subsection (c), the motion itself serves as notice that summary
dismissal is being sought. Id. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1) requires
that the grounds of a motion be stated with 'particularity.' See DeRushe v. State,
146 Idaho 599,200 P.3d 1148 (2009) (reiterating the requirement ofreasonable
particularity in post-conviction cases.) If the state's motion fails to give such
notice of the grounds for dismissal, the court may grant summary dismissal only if
the court first gives the applicant the requisite twenty-day notice of intent to
dismiss and the ground therefore pursuant to I. C. § 19-4906(b). See
Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798. Similarly, where the state
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has filed a motion for summary disposition, but the court dismisses the application
on grounds different from those asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its
own initiative and the court must provide the twenty-day notice.
147 Idaho at 517,211 P.3d at 126 (footnotes omitted). See also, Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,
523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010) ("Thus, where a trial court dismissed a claim based upon
grounds other than those offered- by the State's motion for summary dismissal, and
accompanying memoranda -- the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with
a 20-day notice period.")
In this case, the error in not giving the 20 day notice was not harmless.
Had Mr. Schultz had notice he could have moved to amend his petition to allege
ineffective assistance of trial counsel citing the ineffective assistance of original post-conviction
counsel as a reason to allow this claim to be heard in the successive petition. See I.C. § 19-4906
allowing for amendment of the petition.
Had Mr. Schultz had notice, he could have also argued that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel in an initial post-conviction proceeding is indeed a constitutional violation.
In Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340,343, 160 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2007), cited by the

district court in this case, the Court held that a claim for ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel may not be brought because the applicant for post-conviction relief does not have a right
to effective assistance of counsel. Rios-Lopez relies on Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 908
P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995) which in tum relies upon Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111
S.Ct. 2546 (1991). However, Coleman v. Thompson actually left open the question of whether a
prisoner has a right to effective counsel in criminal proceedings which provide the first occasion
to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. Martinez v. Ryan,_ U.S._, _,132 S.Ct.
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1309, 1315 (2012), states that Coleman suggests that the constitution may require effective
assistance in the initial post-conviction proceeding, but left the question open. Martinez makes a
similar suggestion: "As Coleman noted, this makes the initial-review collateral proceeding a
prisoner's 'one and only appeal' as to an ineffective assistance claim, and this may justify an
exception to the constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings." Id
(citations omitted). However, like Coleman, Martinez leaves the question open. Mr. Schultz
could have made the argument that the question should be addressed and resolved in his case and
that the court should find that he had a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in
post-conviction.
Because the state did not mention anywhere in its motion for summary dismissal or its
briefing that Mr. Schultz's petition should be dismissed because there is no constitutional or
statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction and because the district court
did not cite any other reason for the dismissal of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
district court was required to give Mr. Schultz twenty-days notice of its intent to dismiss. As that
notice was not given, the order of dismissal of that claim must be reversed and the matter
remanded for further proceedings. Buss, supra; Kelly, supra.
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V. CONCLUSION
The failure to give twenty-days notice of the grounds for dismissal of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim require that the order of summary dismissal be reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings.

A-/

Respectfully submitted this2}:aay of January, 2013.

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Wally Kay Scliu tz
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